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NOTE
UNCOUNSELED TRIBAL COURT GUILTY PLEAS IN
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS: INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
VERSUS TRIBAL SELF-GOVERNANCE
Christiana M. Martenson*
Indian tribes in the United States are separate sovereigns with inherent
self-governing authority. As a result, the Bill of Rights does not directly
bind the tribes, and criminal defendants in tribal courts do not enjoy the
protection of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. In United States v.
Ant, a defendant-without the legal assistance that a state or federal court
would have provided-pled guilty to criminal charges in tribal court. Sub-
sequently, the defendant faced federal charges arising out of the same
events that led to the tribal prosecution. The Ninth Circuit in Ant barred
the federal prosecutor from using the defendant's prior uncounseled tribal
court guilty plea as evidence in the federal proceeding, explaining that do-
ing so would violate the Sixth Amendment. This Note argues that Ant is no
longer good law. First, Ant's legal foundation is weak, especially in light
of subsequent developments in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. Second,
Ant is poor policy because excluding tribal court guilty pleas from state
and federal proceedings undermines tribal self-governance. Even though
governments must protect the rights of individual criminal defendants,
supporting tribal authority will ultimately lead to decreased violence on
Indian land and increased consistency with federal legislation.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IN TRODU CTION ...................................................................................... 6 18
I. TRIBAL SELF-GOVERNANCE AND THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL ........................................... 620
A. Tribal Self-Governance and Criminal Jurisdiction ........... 620
B. The Sixth Amendment and the Indian Civil Rights Act ...... 623
II. ANT, CA VANA UGH, AND SHAVANAUX ........................................ 626
A . U nited States v. A nt ........................................................... 627
B. United States v. Cavanaugh ............................................... 628
C. United States v. Shavanaux ............................................... 630
D. Reevaluating Ant in Light of
Cavanaugh and Shavanaux ................................................ 631
III. LEGAL REASONS WHY ANT Is WRONG ..................................... 632
A. Wrong the Day It Was Decided ......................................... 632
B. Wrong in Light of Subsequent Legal Developments .......... 635
* J.D. Candidate, May 2013, University of Michigan Law School. I am grateful to
Bethany Berger, Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Adam Teitelbaum, and the Volume 111 Notes Office.
Michigan Law Review
C. Comity: Deferring to Tribal Court Judgments .................. 636
IV. POLICY REASONS WHY ANT Is WRONG .................................... 639
A. Tribal Control over Crime in Indian Country ................... 639
B. Tribal Self-Governance and the Tribal
Law and Order Act of 2010 ............................................... 640
C. What About the Rights of Tribal Defendants? ................... 642
C O NCLU SION ......................................................................................... 644
INTRODUCTION
On October 27, 1986, Keri Lynn Birdhat, an Indian woman, was found
dead on the Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservation in Montana.' Seven
weeks later, Northern Cheyenne tribal police arrested Francis Floyd Ant,
Birdhat's uncle, and he confessed to killing Birdhat3 Lacking jurisdiction to
charge Ant with homicide,3 the tribe charged Ant with assault and battery.4
Ant entered a guilty plea at his tribal court arraignment and served a six-
month prison sentence.5 He did not have the assistance of counsel during
tribal court proceedings. 6
The United States indicted Ant on January 7, 1987, charging Ant with
voluntary manslaughter in connection with Birdhat's death. 7 Shortly thereaf-
ter, Ant filed a motion to suppress his tribal court guilty plea in federal
court.8 Pointing to the Sixth Amendment, Ant argued that using his uncoun-
seled tribal court guilty plea as evidence in federal court would deprive him
of his constitutional right to counsel. 9 In response, the district court first
ruled that the tribal court proceedings that resulted in Ant's guilty plea were
valid. 10 The court then explained that respect for the Northern Cheyenne
I. United States v. Ant, 882 F.2d 1389, 1390, 1392 (9th Cir. 1989).
2. Id. at 1390-91.
3. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1153
(2006)) (granting the federal government exclusive jurisdiction over murder and manslaughter
committed by an Indian on Indian land).
4. Ant, 882 F.2d at 1390.
5. Id. at 1390-91.
6. Id. at 1390.
7. Id. at 1391. The United States charged Ant under the federal manslaughter statute,
18 U.S.C. § 1112 (1982) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1112 (2006 & Supp. V 2011)). The
federal court did not encounter any double jeopardy problem, see U.S. CONST. amend. V, be-
cause the United States and the Northern Cheyenne are separate sovereigns. See United States
v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 208-09 (2004); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 329-30 (1978).
8. Ant, 882 F.2d at 1391.
9. See id. Although the Ninth Circuit's opinion did not describe Ant's argument in
detail, its discussion implied that Ant contended that admitting his uncounseled tribal court
guilty plea in federal court would violate his constitutional right to counsel. See U.S. CONST.
amend. VI. Because Ant was indigent and faced imprisonment at the time of his guilty plea,
the Sixth Amendment would have entitled Ant to appointed counsel had he appeared in state
or federal court rather than tribal court. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979).
10. Ant, 882 F.2d at 1392.
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tribal judicial system required it to admit Ant's guilty plea as evidence. On
this basis, the court denied Ant's motion.
1 2
Ant appealed his conviction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, which reversed the decision of the district court. The Ninth Circuit
agreed with the district court with respect to the initial validity of Ant's trib-
al court guilty plea.1 3 Although the Sixth Amendment requires state and
federal courts to provide attorneys for indigent criminal defendants facing
imprisonment,14 neither Northern Cheyenne tribal law nor U.S. federal law
required the tribal court to provide counsel to Ant.'5 Thus, Ant's tribal court
guilty plea, despite Ant's lack of legal representation, was consistent with
tribal law, federal law, and the Constitution. 6
However, the Ninth Circuit departed from the district court's judgment
regarding the use of Ant's tribal court guilty plea in federal court. According
to the Ninth Circuit, Ant would have been entitled to counsel in the assault
and battery proceeding if it had taken place in federal court rather than in
tribal court. t7 Therefore, notwithstanding the initial legitimacy of Ant's un-
counseled tribal court guilty plea, admitting Ant's plea as evidence in a
subsequent federal proceeding would have violated the Constitution.
8
For almost twenty-two years, no federal court seriously questioned the
Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Ant. 9 In July 2011, however, two
circuit court decisions raised significant doubts about Ant's status as good
law.2" This legal conflict, combined with evolving policy considerations,
calls for reevaluation of the Ant rule.
11. Id. at 1391.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1392.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Scott, 440 U.S. at 373-74.
15. Ant, 882 F.2d at 1391-92.
16. Id. at 1392.
17. Id. at 1396.
18. Id.
19. Between 1989 and 2011, only the Supreme Court of Montana seriously questioned
the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Ant. See State v. Spotted Eagle, 71 P.3d 1239, 1244 (Mont. 2003)
(holding that Montana courts may consider a defendant's valid uncounseled tribal court con-
victions for sentence enhancement). The Tenth Circuit posed a lesser challenge to Ant when it
held that uncounseled guilty pleas made in tribal courts are admissible in subsequent federal
proceedings for impeachment. United States v. Denetclaw, 96 F.3d 454, 457-58 (10th Cir.
1996). In contrast, both state and federal courts have relied on Ant or have discussed it favora-
bly. E.g., United States v. Percy, 250 F.3d 720, 725-26 (9th Cir. 2001) (questioning whether
the Sixth Amendment binds federal officers during interviews of suspects subsequent to tribal
arraignment in cases where tribal and federal charges intertwine); United States v. Lawrence,
No. CRIM. 05-333(MJD/RLE), 2006 WL 752920, at *4 (D. Minn. 2006) (holding that a de-
fendant's uncounseled tribal court guilty plea could not be used in opposition to the
defendant's motion to suppress evidence in federal court); State v. Watchman, 809 P.2d 641,
646-47 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991) (ruling that a court may not use a defendant's uncounseled tribal
court convictions as aggravating factors for sentencing).
20. See infra Part II.
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This Note argues that federal and state courts should admit uncounseled
tribal court guilty pleas as evidence of underlying conduct, even if the guilty
pleas would have been unconstitutional had they been made in state or fed-
eral court. Part I provides background information about tribal sovereignty
and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Part II explains the Ninth Cir-
cuit's argument in Ant and asserts that two recent cases-United States v.
Cavanaugh and United States v. Shavanaux-indicate the precariousness of
Ant's status as good law. Part III argues that Ant's legal foundation is weak,
especially in light of subsequent developments in Sixth Amendment juris-
prudence. Finally, Part IV contends that Ant is poor policy because
excluding tribal court guilty pleas from state and federal proceedings un-
dermines tribal self-governance.
I. TRIBAL SELF-GOVERNANCE AND THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
This Part introduces the concept of tribal self-governance and describes
the protection of individual rights that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
provides. Section L.A explains that Indian tribes in the United States are
separate sovereigns with inherent powers of self-government. Although
Congress has the power to limit, modify, or terminate tribal authority, the
Bill of Rights does not directly bind the tribes. Instead, as Section I.B ex-
plains, most of the protections provided by the Bill of Rights apply to the
tribes through the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 ("ICRA"). ICRA's
modified version of the Bill of Rights does not, however, provide tribal court
defendants with the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
A. Tribal Self-Governance and Criminal Jurisdiction
In 1831 and 1832, Chief Justice John Marshall explained the relation-
ship between the federal government, states, and Indian tribes in two
opinions that form the foundation of modem tribal self-governance. In
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, Marshall described the Cherokee Nation "as a
state, as a distinct political society, separated from others, capable of manag-
ing its own affairs and governing itself."21 In Marshall's view, Indian tribes
are not foreign states, but "domestic dependent nations" under the protection
of the United States.22 As such, the Cherokee Nation lacked standing as a
foreign state to invoke the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction.23 The fol-
lowing year, in Worcester v. Georgia, Marshall described Indian nations as
"distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural
rights."'24 Because the Cherokee Nation was a separate and independent na-
21. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16(1831).
22. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
23. Id. at 20.
24. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832). However, the Court subsequently "departed from
Chief Justice Marshall's view that the laws of [a State] can have no force within reservation
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tion, the laws of Georgia had no power over tribal members occupying tribal
land.25 According to Marshall, tribes have inherent self-governing power and
exercise this authority under federal supervision with little state interfer-
ence.
2 6
Subsequently, the Supreme Court established that Indian tribes, as self-
governing nations, have the power to create and enforce substantive law on
intratribal matters. For example, tribes have the authority to legislate tribal
membership, 7 inheritance of land'2 1 and domestic relations.29 In addition,
tribes have authority to enforce tribal law in tribal courts.3"
However, tribal self-governance has limits. Although Indian tribes are
distinct political entities, the federal government has the power to restrict
tribal authority, even on tribal land.31 United States v. Kagama asserted that
tribes are "not ... possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty" but are
subject to the acts of Congress.32 Similarly, Talton v. Mayes established that
although the Fifth Amendment does not limit tribal sovereignty, Congress
has the "dominant authority" to limit tribal exercise of self-governing au-
thority.33 The Supreme Court recently confirmed Congress's plenary power
over the self-governance of tribes in United States v. Lara.34 In Lara, the
Court acknowledged inherent tribal sovereignty3" but concluded that Con-
gress possesses broad authority to modify tribal power.36
boundaries." Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 361 (2001) (quoting White Mt. Apache Tribe v.
Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 141 (1980) (internal quotations omitted)).
25. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561.
26. See id.
27. Roff v. Burney, 168 U.S. 218,222 (1897).
28. Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1,29 (1899).
29. United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602, 603-04 (1916).
30. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959) (prohibiting Arizona's exercise of
jurisdictional authority over a civil suit brought by a non-Indian against an Indian where
events leading to the suit occurred on tribal land).
31. See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561. The Supreme Court imposed a significant
limitation on tribal sovereignty during the decade prior to Cherokee Nation and Worcester
when it ruled that Indian tribes lacked authority to grant land to anyone other than the gov-
ernment of the United States. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823).
32. 118 U.S. 375, 381 (1886).
33. 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896); see also Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564
(1981) (holding that tribes do not have inherent authority to regulate hunting and fishing by
nonmembers on tribal land because such authority would constitute "tribal power beyond what
is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations"); Cherokee Na-
tion v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 307-08 (1902) (holding that Congress has the power to enact
legislation for the "control and development of... tribal property").
34. 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
35. Lara, 541 U.S. at 199.
36. Id. at 200 (holding that Congress has the constitutional authority to modify criminal
jurisdiction exercised by Indian tribes over nonmember Indians).
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Partially due to Congress's extensive power over tribal authority, crimi-
nal jurisdiction in Indian territory is complex and confusing.37 In general,
Indian tribes have the authority to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all In-
dians3 8 for crimes committed within tribal territory.39 However, tribes may
not exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians unless Congress confers
such jurisdictional authority on the tribe.40
At the same time, federal laws substantially intrude on tribal criminal ju-
risdiction. With the Indian Country Crimes Act, Congress conferred federal
jurisdiction over crimes committed between Indians and non-Indians in In-
dian territory.4' The Major Crimes Act likewise gives the federal government
jurisdiction over "major" crimes-such as murder and arson-when they
are committed by an Indian in Indian country.4 In practice, the Major
Crimes Act means that Indian tribes must rely on the federal government to
prosecute tribal members who commit major criminal acts on tribal land.43
State law can also interact with tribal law. Public Law 280, passed in
1953, grants certain states the authority to exercise criminal jurisdiction in
Indian country.44 Although Public Law 280 does not exclude tribes from
37. Robert N. Clinton memorably referred to Indian country criminal jurisdiction as a
"jurisdictional maze." Robert N. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction over Indian Lands: A Journey
Through a Jurisdictional Maze, 18 ARIz. L. REv. 503, 504-05 (1976).
38. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323-34 (1978), recognized Indian tribes'
inherent authority to exercise criminal jurisdiction over tribal members. After Duro v. Reina,
495 U.S. 676, 688 (1990), held that Indian tribes lacked the power to assert criminal jurisdic-
tion over nonmember Indians, Congress passed legislation to supersede Duro. Act of Apr. 11,
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73, 77 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006))
("'[P]owers of self-government' means ... the inherent power of Indian tribes.., to exercise
criminal jurisdiction over all Indians... " (emphasis added)). Lara, 541 U.S. at 210, held that
Congress's action was constitutional.
39. See Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 571-72 (1883) (holding that the federal
government may not exercise criminal jurisdiction over Indians for crimes committed on
Indian land absent congressional authorization); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515,
561-62 (1832) (holding that states may not exercise criminal jurisdiction over Indians for
crimes committed on Indian land absent congressional authorization).
40. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978) (holding that the
Suquamish Indian Provisional Court did not have jurisdiction over non-Indian residents of a
Suquamish Indian reservation).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2006). The Indian Country Crimes Act is also known as the Fed-
eral Enclaves Act or the General Crimes Act.
42. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006). Congress passed the Major Crimes Act, ch. 341, § 9, 23
Stat. 362, 385 (1885), one year after the Supreme Court held that federal courts had no juris-
diction over murders committed by Indians against other Indians in Indian territory, see Crow
Dog, 109 U.S. at 571-72. The Act originally gave the federal government exclusive jurisdic-
tion over seven major crimes. Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Criminal Law and Tribal
Self-Determination, 84 N.C. L. REv. 779, 804 (2006). However, subsequent amendments have
significantly increased the number of "major" crimes covered by the Act. See id. at 823-26.
43. See S. REP. No. 111-93, at 3 (2009).
44. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1162 (2006 & Supp. V 2011)), The original version of Public Law 280 gave comprehensive
civil and criminal jurisdiction to five states and gave all other states the option of acquiring the
same jurisdictional authority. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 6.04[3][a]
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exercising jurisdiction concurrently with the states,45 it still intrudes on tribal
law enforcement authority over tribal members on tribal land.46
B. The Sixth Amendment and the Indian Civil Rights Act
While Congress has enacted legislation to limit the criminal jurisdiction
of tribes, it has also granted tribes a level of autonomy when it comes to
defining the rights of criminal defendants in tribal court-particularly the
rights of criminal defendants under the Sixth Amendment. The Sixth
Amendment provides a criminal defendant with a host of procedural rights,
including the right "to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."47 In
Powell v. Alabama, the Supreme Court first recognized an indigent criminal
defendant's constitutional right to court-appointed counsel in a capital tri-
al.48 The Court, incorporating the Sixth Amendment right to legal counsel
against the states, held that a state that denied criminal defendants the right
to counsel violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.4 9 The
Court reasoned that even an "intelligent and educated layman" lacks the
knowledge and experience necessary to make himself heard in a legal tribu-
nal. 0
Gideon v. Wainwright extended the right to court-appointed counsel to
indigent felony defendants in state courts." The Court then clarified the
right to counsel in Argersinger v. Hamlin, holding that courts may not sen-
tence either misdemeanor or felony defendants to imprisonment without
giving them an opportunity to have legal representation at trial.52 Finally, in
(Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2005). Subsequent amendments to Public Law 280 allowed
states to transfer jurisdiction to the federal government and required tribal consent for addi-
tional states to acquire jurisdiction. Id.
45. See Walker v. Rushing, 898 F2d 672, 675 (8th Cir. 1990); COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAw, supra note 44, at § 6.04[3][c].
46. One specific example of this intrusion occurs when a state court refuses to recog-
nize a tribal court judgment. See, e.g., Teague v. Bad River Band of the Lake Superior
Chippewa Indians, 612 N.W.2d 709, 720 (Wis. 2000). For more information on the history and
implications of Public Law 280, see Vanessa J. Jimrnez & Soo C. Song, Concurrent Tribal
and State Jurisdiction Under Public Law 280, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1627 (1998).
47. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
48. 287 U.S. 45, 68, 71 (1932). Read narrowly, Powelrs holding applies only to capital
cases in which the defendant can neither retain counsel at his own expense nor adequately
represent himself. Powell, 287 U.S. at 71. In Johnson v. Zerbst, the Court clarified that the
right to counsel applies more broadly. 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938) ("If the accused .. . is not
represented by counsel and has not competently and intelligently waived his constitutional
right, the Sixth Amendment stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and sentence
depriving him of his life or his liberty."), abrogated on other grounds by Edwards v. Arizona,
451 U.S. 477 (1981). After Powell and Zerbst established criminal defendants' right to counsel
at trial, Massiah v. United States extended the right to counsel to pretrial investigation. 377
U.S. 201,206 (1964).
49. Powell, 287 U.S. at 71.
50. Id. at 68-69.
51. See 372 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1963).
52. 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
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Scott v. Illinois, the Court confirmed that the right to counsel turns on actual,
rather than potential, imprisonment.53 That is, the Sixth Amendment does
not require the state to provide an attorney to an indigent misdemeanor de-
fendant who faces possible, but not mandatory, incarceration if convicted.
However, if the state declines to provide legal counsel, the court may not
sentence the defendant to a prison term.
Although criminal defendants facing imprisonment in federal and state
courts enjoy the right to court-appointed legal counsel, criminal defendants
in tribal courts do not enjoy the same right. In 1896, Talton v. Mayes held
that the Fifth Amendment does not restrict tribal self-governance. 4 The Su-
preme Court explained that the inherent self-governing powers of Indian
tribes existed prior to the Constitution, so the Fifth Amendment does not
limit these powers.55 The Court has subsequently extended the principle of
Talton, declaring that tribes are "unconstrained by those constitutional pro-
visions framed specifically as limitations on federal or state authority."5 6
Thus, the Constitution alone does not provide tribal defendants with a right
to legal counsel.57 The Talton principle, combined with complaints of civil
rights violations in Indian country, ultimately led to the passage of the Indi-
an Civil Rights Act ("ICRA") in 1968.58
ICRA imposes the majority of the rights enumerated in the Bill of
Rights on Indian tribes, while simultaneously recognizing inherent powers
of tribal self-government. Section 1301 lays out definitions for the purposes
of the Act and stresses that "powers of self-government" are inherent to fed-
erally recognized Indian tribes and include the authority to "exercise
criminal jurisdiction over all Indians."59 Section 1302 places limited re-
strictions on tribal governments in order to protect the individual rights of
tribal members.60 While developing § 1302, the Senate committee consid-
ered a bill that would have imposed the Bill of Rights in its entirety on tribal
governments. 61 However, the committee realized the potential imprudence
of imposing the legal norms of the U.S. government on Indian tribes that
53. 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979).
54. 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896).
55. Talton, 163 U.S. at 348.
56. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978).
57. Tom v. Sutton, 533 F.2d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 1976); Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d
231,241 (9th Cir. 1974).
58. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (2006 & Supp. V 2011);
see Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 881 (2d Cir. 1996); SUBCOMM.
ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., CONSTITU-
TIONAL RIGHTS OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN: SUMMARY REPORT OF HEARINGS AND
INVESTIGATIONS 3-5 (Comm. Print 1966) [hereinafter SUMMARY REPORT]. The legislative
history of ICRA demonstrates congressional concern for protection of individual rights, espe-
cially in the area of criminal procedure. See SUMMARY REPORT, supra.
59. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2).
60. Id. § 1302.
61. SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 58, at 8.
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possessed a variety of unique cultural values and beliefs. 62 With this in
mind, Congress passed a more limited version of the bill.63
Significantly, § 1302 does not fully impose the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel on Indian tribes. Instead of being obliged to provide legal counsel
to any criminal defendant in tribal court who faces actual imprisonment and
cannot afford his own attorney, tribes must not deny a criminal defendant
access to legal counsel whom the defendant has retained "at his own ex-
pense."I At the same time, ICRA limits the penalty that tribes may impose
on a defendant to one year of imprisonment, a fine of $5,000, or both, for
any single offense.6 5 In 2010, the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010
("TLOA") modified ICRA and granted tribes authority to sentence criminal
defendants to three years of incarceration, fine them $15,000, or both, for
any single offense.66 However, if a tribe sentences an individual to a prison
term of more than one year, the tribe must provide that defendant with a
right to counsel "at least equal to that guaranteed by the United States Con-
stitution. ' '67 In other words, tribes must provide counsel to indigent
defendants whom they incarcerate for more than one year.
The primary purpose of ICRA was to protect the individual rights of
tribal members. The Senate committee expressed its strong concern for
"deprivation of individual rights by tribal governments" 68 and developed
ICRA in order "to safeguard the rights of Indian citizens. '69 However, Con-
gress did not intend to extend rights to individuals by destroying tribal
sovereignty.70 Rather, Congress sought a compromise between protection of
62. Id. at 9.
63. 25 U.S.C. § 1302; see also SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 58, at 25. Among other
omissions and limitations, § 1302 omits the First Amendment's prohibition against govern-
mental establishment of religion and the Seventh Amendment's right to a jury trial in civil
cases, and it limits the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW, supra note 44, § 14.04[2]. Finally, § 1303 provides the writ of habeas corpus to
remedy alleged illegal incarceration by an Indian tribe. 25 U.S.C. § 1303. Under the Supreme
Court's ruling in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, habeas corpus is the exclusive federal reme-
dy for alleged tribal violations of § 1302. 436 U.S. 49, 70 (1978) (explaining that Congress,
balancing individual rights with tribal sovereignty, sought to provide only limited opportuni-
ties for federal review of tribal actions).
64. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(6); see, e.g., United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 596
(8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1542 (2012); United States v. Ant, 882 F.2d 1389,
1391-92 (9th Cir. 1989).
65. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7)(B).
66. Id. § 1302(a)(7)(C).
67. Id. § 1302(c).
68. SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 58, at 24.
69. Id. at 5.
70. E.g., Arthur Lazarus, Jr., Title It of the 1968 Civil Rights Act: An Indian Bill of
Rights, 45 N.D. L. REV. 337, 346 (1968-1969) ("Congress viewed extension of the Bill of
Rights to Indian reservations as a tool for strengthening tribal institutions and organizations,
not as a weapon for their destruction.").
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individual rights and preservation of tribal self-governance. 71 In Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez, a seminal case construing ICRA, the Supreme Court
held that tribal courts-rather than federal courts-are the appropriate fo-
rums for adjudicating disputes over the rights created by ICRA.72 With this
holding, the Supreme Court recognized ICRA's dual purpose of protecting
individual rights from tribal interference and protecting tribal sovereignty
from federal and state interference. 73 In fact, by prioritizing the legitimation
of tribal courts over the provision of a forum for grievances alleging depri-
vation of individual rights, the Court largely shifted the focus of ICRA from
individual rights to tribal sovereignty.74
From one perspective, ICRA can be understood as an important exten-
sion of civil rights to all U.S. citizens, regardless of their status as members
of Indian tribes. From another perspective, however, ICRA can be under-
stood as a harmful interference with tribal sovereignty. This conflict
between individual rights and tribal sovereignty forms the backdrop for the
Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Ant.
II. ANT, CAVANAUGH, AND SHAVANAUX
This Part examines the Ant court's decision to exclude evidence of a de-
fendant's prior tribal court guilty plea in light of two subsequent circuit
decisions: United States v. Cavanaugh, decided by the Eighth Circuit, and
United States v. Shavanaux, decided by the Tenth Circuit. Section II.A de-
scribes the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Ant. Although the Ant court found
that the defendant's guilty plea was valid in tribal court, it held that a federal
prosecutor could not introduce the guilty plea as evidence of a federal crime.
The tribal plea did not meet the standards set by the Sixth Amendment and
therefore could not be considered in a court where the Sixth Amendment
applied. However, Cavanaugh, discussed in Section II.B, and Shavanaux,
discussed in Section II.C, challenge this ruling. Finally, Section II.D argues
that the validity of Ant must be reevaluated in light of Cavanaugh and Sha-
vanaux.
71. See SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 58, at 24 ("Besides extending protection to the
rights of individual Indians, it is also important that the legitimate interests of the Indian
communities in a lawful and peaceable order be recognized.").
72. See 436 U.S. 49, 64-66, 72 (1978).
73. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 62 ("Two distinct and competing purposes are manifest in the
provisions of the ICRA: In addition to its objective of strengthening the position of individual
tribal members vis-A-vis the tribe, Congress also intended to promote the well-established
federal 'policy of furthering Indian self-government.'" (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S.
535, 551 (1974))).
74. See id. at 64-66, 72; Vincent C. Milani, Note, The Right to Counsel in Native Amer-
ican Tribal Courts: Tribal Sovereignty and Congressional Control, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1279, 1293 (1994) ("As a result [of Martinez], it became very difficult, if not impossible, for a
Native American aggrieved by an alleged ICRA violation to pursue a claim against the tribe
.... .).
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A. United States v. Ant
In Ant, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a federal court may not admit a
defendant's uncounseled tribal court guilty plea as evidence of the actions
underlying that guilty plea.75 Prior to his federal indictment, Ant had pled
guilty to tribal charges of assault and battery in connection with the death of
his niece.76 Subsequently, Ant faced federal manslaughter charges arising
out of the same events, and the federal prosecutor sought to use Ant's tribal
court guilty plea as evidence in federal court.7 7 The district court denied
Ant's motion to suppress his guilty plea on Sixth Amendment grounds.71
In reversing the order of the district court, the Ninth Circuit first found
that Ant's tribal court guilty plea was valid at its inception under both feder-
al and tribal law.7 9 Under ICRA, Ant had no federal right to court-appointed
counsel during tribal proceedings.8" Northern Cheyenne tribal law provided
Ant with a right to legal counsel but only at his own expense." Because nei-
ther ICRA nor Northern Cheyenne law provides criminal defendants with
court-appointed counsel, both the district court and the circuit court deter-
mined that Ant's lack of counsel in tribal court violated neither federal nor
tribal law.8 2 Thus, the Ninth Circuit ruled that Ant's tribal court guilty plea
was valid in tribal court. 83
In spite of the original validity of Ant's tribal court guilty plea, the Ninth
Circuit held that the federal prosecutor could not use Ant's plea as evidence of
the acts giving rise to the plea.84 The court began by asserting that Ant's un-
counseled tribal court guilty plea should be treated as if Ant had pled guilty in
federal court, rather than in tribal court.85 Within this hypothetical framework,
the court explained, Ant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached at his
arraignment in tribal court.86 In other words, if the tribal court had been a fed-
eral court, Ant's lack of legal representation would have violated the
Constitution. Because Ant's plea would have been unconstitutional if it had
been made in federal court, the court held that evidentiary use of Ant's un-
counseled tribal court guilty plea in federal court was unconstitutional.8 7
75. United States v. Ant, 882 F.2d 1389, 1395, 1396 (9th Cir. 1989).
76. Id. at 1390-91.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1391.
79. Id. at 1392.
80. Id.; see also 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(6) (1982) (current version at 25 U.S.C.
§ 1302(a)(6) (Supp. V 2011)).
81. Ant, 882 F.2d at 1391-92.
82. Id. at 1392.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1395.
85. Id. at 1393.
86. Id. at 1393-94.
87. Id. at 1395-96 (holding that a constitutionally infirm guilty plea, even if made in
compliance with tribal law and ICRA, is inadmissible in a federal prosecution).
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Although the Ant court grounded its opinion in case law, a significant
policy disagreement lurked beneath the Ninth Circuit's legal argument. On
one hand, the district court implied that federal courts should protect tribal
self-governance, even at the expense of individual rights. The district court
admitted Ant's tribal court guilty plea based on its view that suppressing the
plea would undermine the validity of tribal proceedings.88 On the other
hand, the Ninth Circuit majority asserted an implicit preference for protect-
ing individual rights over preserving tribal self-governance. The majority
opinion concluded that protecting the individual defendant's right to counsel
required exclusion of Ant's plea.89 By excluding the plea, according to the
dissent, the majority communicated the idea that tribal proceedings are ille-
gitimate. 90 In this way, Ant highlights the tension between the rights of
individual defendants and the preservation of tribal self-governance.
B. United States v. Cavanaugh
In July 2011, the Eighth and Tenth Circuits issued opinions in
Cavanaugh9 and Shavanaux,9 2 two cases that threaten Ant's continued legit-
imacy. In Cavanaugh, the Eighth Circuit held that a federal court may
consider uncounseled tribal court convictions when the charge against the
defendant is based on prior offenses. 93 The prosecution charged the defend-
ant, Cavanaugh, with domestic assault by a habitual offender under 18
U.S.C. § 117 .94 Section 117 requires at least two prior domestic assault con-
victions and explicitly provides that prior tribal court judgments may fulfill
this requirement.95 The crime has a maximum penalty of ten years in pris-
on.96 Assault by a nonhabitual offender, in contrast, carries less severe
penalties.9 7 If the federal prosecutor had charged Cavanaugh under the non-
habitual-offender statute, Cavanaugh likely would have faced six months of
88. Id. at 1391.
89. Id. at 1396. However, the dissent claimed that the majority's judgment would result
in the unjustifiable expansion of ICRA's individual rights protections. Id. at 1398 & n.2
(O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 1397 ("Whether the majority intends it or not, its opinion will be construed to
mean that evidence from tribal court proceedings obtained in a way which clearly complies
with ICRA and tribal law will be suppressed largely because we do not regard tribal courts to
be as 'civilized' as state and federal courts."). The majority disagreed with the dissent's char-
acterization of the majority opinion. Id. at 1396 (majority opinion).
91. United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 E3d 592 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
1542 (2012).
92. United States v. Shavanaux, 647 E3d 993 (10th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
1742 (2012).
93. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 605.
94. Id. at 593; see 18 U.S.C. § 117 (2006).
95. 18 U.S.C. § 117(a).
96. Id.
97. Id. § 113(a)(4).
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incarceration.98 In effect, therefore, Cavanaugh dealt with the use of prior
uncounseled tribal convictions for statutory sentence enhancement in federal
court. 99
Just as the Ant court began by confirming the legitimacy of Ant's prior
tribal court guilty plea, the Cavanaugh court began by asserting the validity
of Cavanaugh's prior tribal court convictions. Under ICRA, Indian defend-
ants in tribal court who face less than one year in prison have no
constitutional or statutory right to court-appointed counsel unless tribal law
affords them such a right. 100 The laws of the Spirit Lake Tribe did not pro-
vide Cavanaugh with a right to court-appointed counsel, so the court found
that Cavanaugh's prior convictions were "valid [from] their inception."''
The Eighth Circuit's determination of the initial validity of Cavanaugh's
prior tribal court convictions was essentially the same as the Ninth Circuit's
determination of initial validity in Ant.10 2 Both courts found that prior tribal
court convictions are valid, despite lack of counsel, when neither federal nor
tribal law is violated.
However, Cavanaugh retreated from Ant by ruling that a federal court
may consider a defendant's prior tribal court convictions, at least for the pur-
pose of sentence enhancement. Cavanaugh primarily relied on the Supreme
Court's decision in Nichols v. United States, which held that a defendant's
prior uncounseled state conviction may increase the defendant's prison term
for a subsequent offense without violating the Sixth Amendment. 113 Accord-
ing to the Cavanaugh court, Nichols demanded the presence of an actual
constitutional violation before barring the use of prior convictions in subse-
quent proceedings. 14 Cavanaugh's uncounseled convictions-like those of the
Nichols defendant-were constitutionally valid at their inception. Because no
constitutional violation occurred with respect to these underlying convictions,
the Cavanaugh court declined to preclude the use of these convictions in fed-
eral court. 105
98. See id.
99. Using prior convictions for statutory sentence enhancement may be distinguished
from using prior convictions for judicial sentence enhancement. In the latter case, prior con-
victions act as aggravating factors. E.g., United States v. Benally, 756 F.2d 773, 779 (10th Cir.
1985) (holding that state court judges may consider prior uncounseled tribal court convictions
for judicial sentence enhancement).
100. United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 596 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.
Ct. 1542 (2012).
101. Id. at 594.
102. United States v. Ant, 882 F.2d 1389, 1392 (9th Cir. 1989).
103. 511 U.S. 738, 748-49 (1994).
104. See Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 601 ("Post-Nichols, then, it is arguable that the fact of
an actual constitutional violation is, perhaps, not only an important factor for determining
when a prior conviction may be used for sentence enhancement purposes, but a required or
controlling factor.").
105. Id. at 603-04.
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C. United States v. Shavanaux
Shortly after the Eighth Circuit delivered its ruling in Cavanaugh, the
Tenth Circuit delivered its opinion in a similar case, Shavanaux.10 6 Like
Cavanaugh, Shavanaux involved the application of § 117 to a defendant
with prior uncounseled tribal court convictions.10 7 In addition, like
Cavanaugh, Shavanaux held that a federal court may consider a defendant's
prior uncounseled tribal court convictions for the purpose of sentence en-
hancement. 108
Unlike Cavanaugh, however, Shavanaux strongly emphasized the sover-
eignty of Indian tribes in the United States.'09 The court explained that tribes
are unique political entities that the Bill of Rights may not directly con-
strain. 10 That being the case, Shavanaux's deprivation of counsel in tribal
court did not amount to a violation of the Sixth Amendment."' Moreover,
the initial constitutional validity of the defendant's tribal court convictions
remained constant, even when a nontribal court used the convictions in a
later proceeding: "Use of tribal convictions in a subsequent prosecution
cannot violate 'anew' the Sixth Amendment, because the Sixth Amendment
was never violated in the first instance."' 2
After ruling that no Sixth Amendment violation had occurred, the Tenth
Circuit found that considering uncounseled tribal convictions for federal
sentence enhancement adheres to Fifth Amendment due process guaran-
tees." I3 Again, the court began by stressing the special status of Indian tribes,
reasoning that tribal courts can be analogized to foreign courts because both
Indian tribes and foreign states "are sovereigns to whom the Bill of Rights
does not apply."'" 4 Given this premise, the Tenth Circuit applied principles
of international comity, which permit recognition of foreign judgments ex-
cept where the foreign court did not provide procedural due process
compatible with that provided by state and federal courts in the United
States." 5 Within this comity framework, the Tenth Circuit ruled that Sha-
vanaux's prior tribal court convictions were consistent with due process
because the tribal court adhered to the procedural provisions of ICRA." 6
The court also asserted that federal courts have frequently recognized for-
106. United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993 (10th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
1742 (2012).
107. Id. at 995-96.
108. Id. at 998.
109. Id. at 996-97.
110. Id. at997.
111. Id.
112. id. at 998 (citation omitted).
113. Id. at lO00.
114. Id. at998.
115. Id. at 998-99. A court in the United States must also refuse to recognize a foreign
judgment when the foreign court lacked jurisdiction over the defendant. Id. at 999.
116. Id. at 1000.
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eign judgments and accepted foreign evidence in situations where foreign
justice systems departed from the procedural protections that the Constitu-
tion guarantees. 7 Similarly, a federal court may recognize tribal
convictions, even when tribal court procedures do not comport precisely
with the Constitution, without violating defendants' Fifth Amendment due
process rights.' 8
D. Reevaluating Ant in Light of Cavanaugh and Shavanaux
Although both Cavanaugh and Shavanaux reached the same essential
conclusion regarding federal recognition of tribal proceedings, they differed
with respect to their treatment of Ant. On one hand, Cavanaugh distin-
guished Ant rather than explicitly calling Ant into question. This was
possible because the two cases addressed subtly distinct issues: In Ant, the
prosecution sought to use the defendant's prior uncounseled tribal court
guilty plea as evidence of the actions underlying the guilty plea."9 In con-
trast, the prosecution in Cavanaugh sought to use the defendant's prior
uncounseled tribal court convictions to prove the fact of conviction, not the
underlying conduct leading to the conviction. 20 Significantly, however, the
Cavanaugh court did not claim consistency with Ant based on these differ-
ences. Instead, the court cited Ant as an example of the unsettled nature of
the law.121
On the other hand, Shavanaux expressed its disagreement with the Ant
decision, even though the two cases dealt with slightly different issues.
Shavanaux asserted that Ant erred by finding constitutional infirmity in the
defendant's uncounseled tribal court guilty plea; as such, the Shavanaux
court stated that it was "at odds with the Ninth Circuit" in its opinion.22
Furthermore, Shavanaux explicitly grounded its opinion in an understanding
of Indian tribes as separate sovereigns with the authority to create, enforce,
and adjudicate criminal laws. 123 In contrast, Ant made little mention of tribal
sovereignty except to argue that suppressing tribal guilty pleas did not dis-
credit tribal court proceedings.' 24 Thus, Shavanaux challenged Ant's legal
conclusion as well as the policy rationale driving that conclusion.
At their most basic levels, both Cavanaugh and Shavanaux are incon-
sistent with Ant, although only Shavanaux explicitly disagreed with the
117. Id. at 1000-01.
118. Id. at 1001.
119. See supra Section H.A.
120. United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 594 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.
Ct. 1542 (2012).
121. Id. at 604-05 ("[R]easonable decision-makers may differ in their conclusions as to
whether the Sixth Amendment precludes a federal court's subsequent use of convictions that
are valid because and only because they arose in a court where the Sixth Amendment did not
apply.").
122. Shavanaux, 647 E3d at 997.
123. Id. at 997, 999.
124. United States v. Ant, 882 F.2d 1389, 1396 (9th Cir. 1989).
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Ninth Circuit's decision. Both Cavanaugh and Shavanaux ruled that un-
counseled tribal court convictions, if initially constitutional, cannot be
deemed "constitutionally infirm" for use in a later proceeding. In contrast,
from the Ninth Circuit's point of view, uncounseled tribal court guilty pleas
can violate the Constitution anew if used in subsequent proceedings where
the Sixth Amendment applies.
Both Cavanaugh and Shavanaux filed petitions for writs of certiorari
with the Supreme Court on the basis of a split among the circuit courts with
respect to federal recognition of tribal proceedings.' 25 Although the Supreme
Court denied these petitions,121 the inconsistency with respect to the consti-
tutionality of tribal court judgments-and their subsequent use in federal
court-suggests that the policy iterated in Ant deserves reevaluation.
III. LEGAL REASONS WHY ANT Is WRONG
This Part examines the legal foundation of Ant and argues that the Ninth
Circuit should overrule its decision if and when it is given the opportunity to
do so. Section III.A suggests that the legal reasoning behind Ant was un-
sound on the day it was decided. Section III.B contends that subsequent
developments in the law further call Ant's continuing legitimacy into ques-
tion. Lastly, Section III.C argues that principles of international comity
counsel in favor of state and federal recognition of tribal court proceedings.
A. Wrong the Day It Was Decided
The Ninth Circuit based its judgment in Ant on a faulty premise. After
the court found that Ant's guilty plea was initially valid, the court ignored
the fact that Ant entered his plea in a tribal court. Instead, the Ant court
claimed an obligation to analyze Ant's guilty plea in a hypothetical nontribal
setting: "[I]t is ... necessary to examine the constitutional validity of Ant's
earlier tribal court guilty plea, independent of issues involving tribal law or
the ICRA, as if the plea had been made in federal court."'12 7 This move was
essential to the court's ultimate decision; without it, the court would have
had a difficult time claiming that subsequent use of a constitutionally valid
guilty plea could violate the Constitution. Despite the significance of this
framing of the issue, the court declined to adequately support its decision
not to examine the constitutionality of Ant's plea in its true tribal-court set-
ting.12
8
125. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Shavanaux v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1742
(2012) (No. 11-7731); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Cavanaugh v. United States, 132 S.
Ct. 1542 (2012) (No. 11-7379).
126. Shavanaux v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1742 (2012), denying cert. to 647 F.3d 993
(10th Cir. 2011); Cavanaugh v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1542 (2012), denying cert. to 643
F.3d 592 (8th Cir. 2011).
127. Ant, 882 F.2d at 1393 (emphasis added).
128. While the Ninth Circuit chose to examine Ant's plea as if it had been made in a
federal court, the Eighth Circuit took the opposite view by explicitly declining to treat prior
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The Ninth Circuit primarily-and unjustifiably-relied on Burgett v.
Texas 129 for its decision to examine Ant's plea as if it had not occurred in a
tribal court. 130 In Burgett, the Supreme Court held that a Texas court could
not use a defendant's prior uncounseled Tennessee convictions to enhance
the defendant's sentence, because the Tennessee convictions violated the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel.' Burgett explained that the
Tennessee convictions were constitutionally infirm under Gideon, which
obligates state courts to provide the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to
criminal defendants. 3 2 In short, Burgett turned on the initial unconstitution-
ality of the Tennessee convictions. In Ant's case, however, no law obligated
the Northern Cheyenne tribal court to provide legal counsel to criminal de-
fendants. Unlike Burgett, Ant did not involve any underlying constitutional
violation. Thus, although Burgett supported the Ninth Circuit's claim that
constitutionally infirm pleas must not be admitted in subsequent proceed-
ings, Burgett offered no support for the Ninth Circuit's decision to examine
Ant's tribal plea in a hypothetical federal-court context.
If the Ninth Circuit had instead examined Ant's guilty plea as a product
of a valid tribal-court proceeding, it could not have justified the exclusion of
the plea from federal court. When analyzing Ant's guilty plea in its true trib-
al-court context, the Ninth Circuit found that the guilty plea in no way
violated the Constitution. 33 The court then explained that the admissibility
of a prior guilty plea in a later proceeding turns on the constitutional validity
of the plea: "An earlier guilty plea. . . [is] admissible in a subsequent feder-
al prosecution, even if the proceedings are in different jurisdictions, if the
earlier guilty plea was made under conditions consistent with the United
States Constitution."'34 Following this logic, Ant's guilty plea should have
been admissible in federal court. Without framing Ant's guilty plea in a
hypothetical federal-court context, the Ninth Circuit would have been hard-
pressed to avoid this outcome.
Although the Ninth's Circuit's flawed reliance on Burgett suggests that
Ant was wrong the day it was decided, the Ninth Circuit did not completely
lack a rationale for its conclusion. First, it is conceivable that Baldasar v.
Illinois'35 supported the court's decision to exclude Ant's guilty plea. In
Baldasar, the Supreme Court held that courts could not use uncounseled
tribal convictions as if they had arisen in state or federal court. Compare id. (evaluating tribal
court guilty plea as if it had been made in federal court), with United States v. Cavanaugh, 643
F.3d 592, 604 (8th Cir. 2011) ("[W]e do not believe we are free to preclude use of the prior
conviction merely because it would have been invalid had it arisen from a state or federal
court."), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1542 (2012).
129. 389 U.S. 109 (1967).
130. Ant, 882 F.2d. at 1393 (citing Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967)).
131. See Burgett, 389 U.S. at 114-15.
132. See id. (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1963)).
133. See Ant, 882 F.2d at 1392 & n.3.
134. Id. at 1392.
135. 446 U.S. 222 (1980) (per curiam), overruled by Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S.
738 (1994).
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misdemeanor convictions to convert a defendant's subsequent misdemeanor
into a felony with a prison term. 136 Although Justice Marshall's concurring
opinion in Baldasar did not question whether the defendant's prior uncoun-
seled conviction was valid at its inception, Marshall contended that it was
"invalid for the purpose of depriving petitioner of his liberty."137 The Ninth
Circuit cited Baldasar and implied that using an uncounseled misdemeanor
plea for sentence enhancement was similar to using an uncounseled tribal
court guilty plea as evidence.138 Following this argument, Baldasar support-
ed exclusion of Ant's tribal court plea.
However, Baldasar's support for Ant falls short. For one thing, Baldasar
is not necessarily controlling. Using a prior state conviction for federal sen-
tence enhancement is not the same as using a prior tribal guilty plea to
establish the elements of a federal crime. Although a valid analogy probably
exists between Baldasar and Ant, the Ninth Circuit declined to flesh out
such an analogy. Instead of basing its decision on the Baldasar rule, the
Ninth Circuit held that Ant's plea was not admissible evidence because the
"tribal proceedings ... were [not] in conformity with the Constitutional re-
quirements for federal prosecutions in federal court."'39 Furthermore,
Baldasar is no longer good law. Even if Baldasar offered a persuasive rea-
son to exclude Ant's tribal court plea at the time of his trial, the Supreme
Court has since overruled Baldasar,140 thereby undermining the court's rul-
ing in Ant.
Second, it is possible that the Ninth Circuit's decision was supported by
Ant's ignorance of the full range of consequences that could stem from his
tribal court guilty plea. In dicta, the Ant court suggested that exclusion of
Ant's plea was warranted because "Ant was not advised that the tribal court
proceedings could be used against him in a subsequent felony prosecution in
federal district court."14' At least one federal court has excluded a defend-
ant's prior state court guilty plea when the defendant did not know that his
state court plea could be used against him in federal court.' 42 By analogy, it
136. Id. at 224.
137. See id. at 226 (Marshall, J., concurring). Three concurring opinions support the
holding expressed-but not explained-in the per curiam majority opinion. Id. at 224 (majori-
ty opinion); id. at 224 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 226-29 (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at
229-30 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
138. Ant, 882 F.2d at 1394.
139. Id. at 1396.
140. Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 748 (1994).
141. Ant, 882 F.2d at 1393.
142. United States v. Edwards, 669 E Supp. 168, 171 (S.D. Ohio 1987); see also United
States v. Howze, 668 F2d 322, 323 (7th Cir. 1982) (explaining that a federal court may con-
sider the validity of a state court guilty plea when the defendant alleges a constitutional defect,
especially "when a defendant may have had no idea of the extreme nature of the collateral
consequences of his plea"). Although Howze suggests that the Ant court could have investigat-
ed the initial validity of Ant's tribal court guilty plea on the basis of Ant's lack of knowledge
of the consequences, the Ant court chose not to do so. Instead, the court confirmed the consti-
tutionality of Ant's guilty plea at its inception. See Ant, 882 F2d at 1392.
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is plausible to argue that a federal court must exclude a defendant's prior
tribal court guilty plea if the defendant was never advised of the plea's pos-
sible federal court consequences.
But this argument does not stand up to scrutiny, as multiple circuits have
held that trial courts need not inform defendants of all potential conse-
quences of pleading guilty.'43 For example, in United States v. Long, the
defendant sought to suppress evidence of a confession made in connection
with a prior state prosecution on the ground that the state had not advised
him that the confession could be used against him in a subsequent federal
proceeding.'" The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument, citing the inde-
pendence of state and federal judicial systems: "The state and federal
systems are separate and distinct, and the defendant need only be informed
of the direct consequences he may face within the particular system."'145 Un-
der Long's reasoning, Ant's alleged ignorance of the federal consequences
of his tribal guilty plea should not bar the admission of the plea in federal
court. Perhaps most significantly, the holding of Ant does not turn on Ant's
possible ignorance of the consequences of his guilty plea but instead rests
on Ant's lack of counsel in tribal court.
B. Wrong in Light of Subsequent Legal Developments
Just as Ant's reasoning was wrong the day it was decided, subsequent
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence confirms the precariousness of its status as
good law. The most significant case to arise after Ant is Nichols. In Nichols,
the defendant argued that using a prior uncounseled conviction to increase
his current prison term violated the Constitution.'46 The Supreme Court dis-
agreed.'47 According to the Court, sentence enhancement based on prior
convictions penalizes only the offense at issue in the current proceeding; it
does not punish the prior offenses.'4 8 As such, lack of counsel at a prior pro-
ceeding does not taint a subsequent proceeding unless the prior lack of
counsel violated the Constitution.'4 9 Applying the reasoning of Nichols to
Ant suggests that the initial validity of Ant's tribal court guilty plea should
have been enough to admit the guilty plea into evidence in federal court.
Nichols also explicitly overruled Baldasar. As discussed previously, just
as Baldasar precluded the use of a valid uncounseled conviction in a
143. E.g., King v. Dutton, 17 F.3d 151, 153 (6th Cir. 1994) ("[T]he trial court is under no
constitutional obligation to inform the defendant of all the possible collateral consequences of
the [guilty] plea."); United States v. Bouthot, 878 F.2d 1506, 1511 (1st Cir. 1989) ("A state
judge, even if she is aware of the federal implications of a state conviction, is not constitution-
ally required to warn a defendant about his federal exposure before accepting his guilty
plea."), abrogated on other grounds by Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012).
144. 852 F.2d 975, 976 (7th Cir. 1988).
145. Long, 852 F.2d at 979.
146. Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 740-41 (1994).
147. Id. at 748-49.
148. Id. at 747.
149. See id. at 748-49.
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subsequent proceeding, Ant precluded the use of a valid uncounseled guilty
plea in a subsequent proceeding. 5° As such, the Baldasar rule-prohibiting
use of uncounseled convictions to convert a misdemeanor into a felony, re-
gardless of the validity of the uncounseled convictions-provided support
for Ant's argument for exclusion.' 5I In contrast, Nichols's overruling of Bal-
dasar weakened Ant and suggested that uncounseled guilty pleas should be
admissible in subsequent proceedings as long as such guilty pleas are con-
stitutionally valid at their inception. Under Nichols, the Ninth Circuit should
have admitted Ant's constitutionally valid guilty plea as evidence in Ant's
subsequent federal prosecution. Thus, post-Nichols, Ant is no longer good
law.
Finally, both Cavanaugh and Shavanaux call Ant into question. As dis-
cussed previously, neither Cavanaugh nor Shavanaux directly contradicts
Ant, because the two recent cases do not address the exact question at issue
in Ant. Cavanaugh and Shavanaux involve the use of prior tribal court con-
victions for federal sentence enhancement, while Ant involves the use of a
prior tribal court guilty plea as evidence to establish a federal crime. How-
ever, as the Tenth Circuit pointed out, both Cavanaugh and Shavanaux
oppose Ant with respect to the constitutionality of uncounseled tribal pro-
ceedings. To the extent that Cavanaugh and Shavanaux hold that valid tribal
proceedings may be used in subsequent federal proceedings without violat-
ing the Constitution, they support the argument for Ant's legal infirmity.
C. Comity: Deferring to Tribal Court Judgments
While Nichols, Cavanaugh, and Shavanaux each undermine Ant's treat-
ment of tribal court judgments, the doctrine of comity provides a solution. 152
Comity is a doctrine of foreign relations law. Under principles of comity,
courts in the United States should treat a foreign judgment as prima facie
evidence of the actions giving rise to the judgment, as long as the foreign
judgment "appears to have been rendered by a competent court" whose
"proceedings are according to the course of a civilized jurisprudence."'53 In
other words, courts should defer to foreign judgments unless they find that
the foreign court was biased or used procedures inconsistent with due pro-
cess. 154
150. United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 599 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.
Ct. 1542 (2012); United States v. Ant, 882 F.2d 1389, 1396 (9th Cir. 1989).
151. See Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 599.
152. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Sovereign Comity: Factors Recognizing Tribal Court
Criminal Convictions in State and Federal Courts, 45 CT. REV. 12, 16-19 (2008-2009).
153. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 205-06 (1895). Hilton describes comity as "the
recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial
acts of another nation." Id. at 164.
154. See id. at 205-06; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 92,
98 (1971); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. §§ 481-482
(1987).
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Comity does not require that the foreign court issuing the judgment ad-
hered to the same procedural standards that bind state and federal courts in
the United States.'55 In Houle v. United States, for example, the Fifth Circuit
admitted prior uncounseled Canadian convictions for federal sentencing,
even though the defendant's prior Canadian convictions would have violated
the Sixth Amendment had they been made in a state or federal court in the
United States. 156 The court emphasized that the Sixth Amendment does not
bind Canadian courts, so the Canadian court's noncompliance with the Sixth
Amendment did not invalidate the defendant's Canadian convictions.1
57
Similarly, in United States v. Small, the Third Circuit admitted the defend-
ant's Japanese convictions to fulfill the elements of a federal charge.'58 The
court found that the Japanese convictions complied with U.S. concepts of
fundamental fairness,'5 9 even though the Japanese investigation and subse-
quent judicial proceedings did not adhere precisely to the Bill of Rights. 60
As Houle and Small indicate, courts in the United States commonly defer to
judgments of foreign courts, even when the foreign proceedings do not fol-
low the strict requirements of state and federal proceedings in the United
States.
161
Within the framework of comity, tribal courts can be thought of as for-
eign courts. This is because Indian tribes are similar to foreign nations to the
extent that they are quasi-sovereign entities that govern themselves without
the constraints of the Bill of Rights. 6 2 In State v. Spotted Eagle, the Mon-
tana Supreme Court applied the doctrine of comity to determine whether a
state court properly used the defendant's prior uncounseled tribal court con-
victions to enhance the defendant's state charge from a misdemeanor to a
felony.'63 First, the court found that the Sixth Amendment did not bind the
Blackfeet Tribe, just as it does not bind a foreign nation."6 Second, treating
the tribal court as a foreign court, the court determined that the tribal judg-
ment was also valid for use in Montana courts, despite the tribal court's
nonconformance with the Bill of Rights: "Comity requires that a court give
full effect to the valid judgments of a foreign jurisdiction according to that
155. See Hilton, 159 U.S. at 204-05.
156. 493 F.2d 915, 916 n.2 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
157. Houle, 493 F.2d at 916.
158. 333 F.3d 425, 428 (3d Cir. 2003), rev'd on other grounds, 554 U.S. 385 (2005).
159. Small, 333 E3d at 428.
160. United States v. Small, 183 E Supp. 2d 755, 767-70 (W.D. Pa. 2002), aff'd, 333
F.3d 425 (3d Cit. 2003), rev'd on other grounds, 554 U.S. 385 (2005).
161. See, e.g., United States v. Kole, 164 F.3d 164, 175 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that the
absence of a jury in a Philippine proceeding leading to defendant's conviction did not invali-
date the Philippine conviction for the purpose of federal sentence enhancement); United States
v. Wilson, 556 F.2d 1177, 1178 (4th Cir. 1977) (holding that the defendant's German convic-
tion, obtained without a jury trial, was admissible to impeach the defendant's credibility).
162. See Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 337
(2008) (citing Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896)).
163. 7t P.3d 1239, 1244-45 (Mont. 2003).
164. Spotted Eagle, 71 P.3d at 1243-44.
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sovereign's laws, not the Sixth Amendment standard that applies to proceed-
ings in Montana."'6 5 Finally, the court explained that declining to admit
valid tribal court convictions would compromise tribal sovereignty and un-
dermine the legitimacy of tribal judicial proceedings. 166 This nod to tribal
sovereignty suggests that the court's view of tribes as self-governing nations
was a significant force underlying its opinion.
Following the state court's decision in Spotted Eagle, the Tenth Circuit
in Shavanaux applied principles of comity in its analysis of federal recogni-
tion of tribal court judgments. Shavanaux held that tribal judgments that are
valid under ICRA are per se compliant with constitutional due process. 167
Explaining this holding, Shavanaux stressed that tribal courts need not have
judicial procedures identical to those of the United States in order to meet
the due process requirement under the doctrine of comity.168
Although both Spotted Eagle and Shavanaux dealt with the use of prior
tribal court convictions for sentence enhancement, 169 the comity framework
applies equally to the use of prior tribal court guilty pleas as evidence of the
actions giving rise to the convictions. This is because the underlying issue-
validity of tribal court judgments in a nontribal court-is the same.
Although the Ant majority implied that comity principles were inappropriate
in analyzing evidentiary use of tribal court judgments, it based this conclu-
sion on the fact that courts had previously applied federal-tribal comity to
only a narrow set of circumstances.1 70 Now that Spotted Eagle and Sha-
vanaux have broadened the concept of federal-tribal comity, Ant's rationale
has lost most of its force. Moreover, both the district court opinion 171 and the
dissenting opinion in Ant 172 applied principles of comity and reached results
consistent with Spotted Eagle. Both Judge Battin of the District of Montana
and Judge O'Scannlain of the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the Ant majority
and found that federal courts should admit evidence of prior uncounseled
165. Id. at 1245.
166. Id.
167. United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 1000 (10th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132
S. Ct. 1742 (2012).
168. Id. at 1000-01; see also Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 811 (9th Cir. 1997)
("Comity does not require that a tribe utilize judicial procedures identical to those used in the
United States Courts. ... Federal courts must also be careful to respect tribal jurisprudence
along with the special customs and practical limitations of tribal court systems.").
169. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at 995-96; Spotted Eagle, 71 P.3d at 1240.
170. United States v. Ant, 882 F.2d 1389, 1396 (9th Cir. 1989) ("[T]he principle of fed-
eral-tribal comity has heretofore been used primarily to prevent direct attacks on tribal
proceedings in federal courts, and to require exhaustion of tribal remedies before going to
federal court.").
171. Id. at 1390 (noting that the district court "ruled that suppressing the [defendant's
tribal court guilty] plea would violate principles of comity").
172. Id. at 1396 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting) (invoking comity by arguing that tribal
court "proceedings are entitled to the dignity shown to foreign courts").
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tribal court guilty pleas for the purpose of proving conduct underlying the
pleas. 173
IV. POLICY REASONS WHY ANT Is WRONG
Ant is not only wrong as a matter of law-it is wrong as a matter of pol-
icy. This Part addresses the policy debate underlying the legal question of
whether judges can admit defendants' prior uncounseled tribal court guilty
pleas as evidence in state and federal courts. One side of the debate argues
that protecting the rights of criminal defendants mandates exclusion of prior
uncounseled tribal court guilty pleas and convictions in state and federal
courts, while the other side maintains that tribal self-governance requires
admission of uncounseled tribal pleas and convictions.
This Part contends that arguments in favor of admission should prevail
over those in favor of exclusion. Section IV.A argues that increased tribal
self-governance will lead to increasingly effective law enforcement, thereby
reducing crime and violence in Indian country. Section IV.B examines the
Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 as evidence of a federal policy that priori-
tizes tribal self-governance. Finally, Section IV.C posits that the
legislature-and not the judiciary-must remedy any shortcomings of the
limited right to counsel enjoyed by tribal court defendants.
A. Tribal Control over Crime in Indian Country
As a policy matter, state and federal courts should admit tribal court
guilty pleas as evidence of federal crimes because doing so will decrease
violence that occurs on tribal land. Indian tribes face an epidemic of violent
crime on Indian land. The rate of violent crime for American Indians is sig-
nificantly greater than that for other U.S. racial and ethnic groups and is
more than two times the national average. 7 4 In fact, President Barack
Obama has called the high crime rates in Indian country "unconsciona-
ble."175
To counter this disturbing trend of violence, Indian tribes must play a
significant role in creating and implementing criminal law on tribal land.'7 6
173. Id.
174. STEVEN W. PERRY, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ
203097, AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME, at iii (2004) (analyzing data spanning the years
1992-2002); see also Washburn, supra note 42, at 786-90 (describing the "crisis" of violent
crime on Indian reservations).
175. Remarks on Signing Legislation to Protect Indian Arts and Crafts Through the Im-
provement of Applicable Criminal Proceedings, and for Other Purposes, 2010 DAILY COMP.
PRES. DOc. 637 (July 29, 2010) [hereinafter TLOA Presidential Remarks], available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201000637/pdf/DCPD-201000637.pdf.
176. See Washburn, supra note 42, at 832. Tribes have also communicated their desire to
develop tribal justice systems free from stifling federal oversight. See, e.g., Enforcement of the
Indian Civil Rights Act: Hearing Held in Phoenix, Ariz. Before the U.S. Comm'n on Civil
Rights 9-10 (1988) (statement of Tom Tso, C.J., Navajo Nation) ("It would be unrealistic for
you to expect our far younger [Navajo] legal system to gain maturity without ... struggle.
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Any criminal justice system must have the support of the community it
seeks to regulate in order to be effective.' 77 Because a criminal justice sys-
tem must reflect community norms and values to gain community
acceptance, increased tribal involvement in tribal criminal justice will lead
to more effective law enforcement and decreased crime and violence.1 78
Admission of uncounseled tribal court guilty pleas in state and federal
courts furthers the goals of tribal law enforcement. State and federal recog-
nition of uncounseled tribal court convictions reinforces tribal authority to
prosecute and punish Indians who commit crimes on Indian land. 17 9 As le-
gitimacy increases, tribal justice systems can more effectively combat
violence on Indian land. More broadly, by recognizing tribal judgments,
state and federal courts validate tribal law, tribal values, and the tribal com-
munity itself. The continuing strength of the tribal conviction in state or
federal court stands for the continuing strength of the tribal community, es-
pecially the strength of its criminal justice institutions.
B. Tribal Self-Governance and the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010
In addition to facilitating positive change on the ground, admitting tribal
court guilty pleas in state and federal courts will achieve consistency with a
federal policy of tribal self-governance that has undergone significant
change since Ant. On July 29, 2010, President Obama signed the Tribal Law
and Order Act of 2010 ("TLOA") into law.' 80 TLOA, Congress's response to
increasing crime and violence in Indian country,'8 ' implicitly supports fed-
eral and state use of prior tribal court guilty pleas. By increasing tribal
control over law enforcement in Indian country and declining to expand
federal involvement with tribal court procedures, TLOA indicates a federal
preference for tribal self-governance.
With the passage of TLOA, Congress acknowledged that federal
interference with criminal justice in Indian country has undermined tribal
self-governance. In its report recommending the passage of TLOA, the Sen-
ate emphasized that federal law often displaces tribal law enforcement
authority, "forc[ing] tribal communities to rely on federal officials to inves-
What we ask of you and the Congress is help from our terms, and more importantly, patience
and tolerance.").
177. Washburn, supra note 42, at 840-41; see also WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE
OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 283 (2011) (identifying local administration as a key reform
to the criminal justice system); cf Kevin K. Washburn, American Indians, Crime, and the
Law, 104 MICH. L. REV. 709, 713 (2006) (stating that the U.S. criminal justice system was
designed around the idea of local resolution of disputes).
178. Washburn, supra note 42, at 847; see also Emily Tredeau, Comment, Tribal Control
in Federal Sentencing, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1409, 1425-27 (2011) (arguing that increasing tribal
control of federal sentencing furthers the goals of tribal self-determination).
179. See State v. Spotted Eagle, 71 P.3d 1239, 1245 (Mont. 2003).
180. Tribal Law and Order Act ("TLOA") of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, tit. II, 124 Stat.
2258, 2261-301 (codified in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.); TLOA Presidential Remarks,
supra note 175.
181. S. RaP. No. 111-93, at 1-3 (2009).
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tigate and prosecute all reservation crimes committed by non-Indians
against Indian victims and most serious crimes committed by Indians.' 18 2 In
particular, the Senate Report expressed concern that federal investigators,
with exclusive authaority to prosecute certain major crimes in Indian territo-
ry, frequently decline to prosecute without explaining their decision to the
tribe.183 The Senate Report also highlighted the jurisdictional complexity
that federal law has created with regard to Indian country law enforcement
and the resulting inefficiency and ineffectiveness of law enforcement on
tribal land.s 4 By significantly reducing tribal control over crime and pun-
ishment on tribal land, federal law has left tribes without the tools they need
to protect their members and to enforce their unique tribal values through
criminal law.
185
In response to these problems of federal interference, Congress designed
TLOA to enhance tribal self-governance. TLOA explicitly acknowledges
that "tribal justice systems are often the most appropriate institutions for
maintaining law and order in Indian country"' 86 and states that the purposes
of TLOA include "empower[ing] tribal governments with the authority ...
necessary to safely and effectively provide public safety in Indian coun-
try."' 87 Before signing the bill into law, President Obama highlighted the
additional law enforcement power that TLOA gives to Indian tribes: "[I]t
gives tribes greater authority to prosecute and punish criminals them-
selves.... And it strengthens tribal courts and police departments ...."188
Moreover, TLOA aims to increase coordination between federal, state, local,
and tribal governments, as opposed to encouraging unilateral federal inves-
tigation and law enforcement.'89 By increasing tribal law enforcement
182. Id. at 3.
183. Id. at 12.
184. Id. at 3-4; see Law Enforcement in Indian Country: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Indian Affairs, 110th Cong. 65-67 (2007) (statement of Thomas B. Heffelfinger, Partner,
Best and Flanagan, LLP) (discussing the "jurisdiction confusion" that undermines the efficacy
and legitimacy of Indian country law enforcement).
185. See Washburn, supra note 42, at 836-42 (arguing that the federal Major Crimes Act
"assaults the notion of tribal self-determination").
186. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 202(a)(2)(B), 124 Stat.
2258, 2261.
187. Id. § 202(b)(3). In addition, the U.S. Department of Justice has emphasized the
importance of tribal sovereignty to TLOA. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP'T OF THE
INTERIOR WITH WORK GRP. ON CORRECTIONS, TRIBAL LAW AND ORDER ACT: LONG TERM
PLAN TO BUILD AND ENHANCE TRIBAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 7 (2011) ("A foundational principle
in the development of tribal justice systems, and therefore in any consideration of changing
those systems, is tribal sovereignty.").
188. TLOA Presidential Remarks, supra note 175.
189. See Tribal Law and Order Act § 202(b)(l)-(2), (6). For example, § 222 encourages
state, tribal, and local governments to enter into cooperative law-enforcement and cross-
deputization agreements. See § 222, 124 Stat. at 2272 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 2815 (Supp. V
2011)). Section 212 mandates coordination between federal and tribal law enforcement when
a federal entity terminates investigation of an alleged violation of federal law in Indian coun-
try without referring it for prosecution. § 212, 124 Stat. at 2267-68 (amending 25 U.S.C.
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authority and encouraging tribal governments to work with local, state, and
federal governments, TLOA recognizes Indian tribes as self-governing na-
tions with an interest in controlling Indian country crime on their own terms.
One of the most significant provisions of TLOA, § 234, recognizes tribal
sovereignty by increasing tribal sentencing authority. 90 Previously, ICRA
limited the term of imprisonment that a tribal court could impose on a crim-
inal defendant to one year. 9' Section 234 amends ICRA by providing that
tribes may sentence a defendant to a term of up to three years.' 92 In the Sen-
ate's view, tribes need this increased sentencing authority in order to control
increasing levels of violent crime on Indian land.'93 Granting this sentencing
authority to tribes-rather than extending federal or state jurisdiction to
cover the violent crimes that Indian tribes face-signals the federal govern-
ment's commitment to strengthening tribal institutions. Arguably, state and
federal courts undermine this commitment when they refuse to acknowledge
tribal court guilty pleas as evidence.
At the same time that TLOA increases tribal sentencing authority, the
law deliberately declines to extend full Sixth Amendment protections to
tribal defendants. Significantly, tribes must provide criminal defendants fac-
ing a term of imprisonment of more than one year with "the right to
effective assistance of counsel at least equal to that guaranteed by the United
States Constitution"-namely, the Sixth Amendment.'94 This right to coun-
sel includes the right of indigent defendants to obtain legal representation
"at the expense of the tribal government."''95 Although TLOA's expansion of
tribal defendants' right to counsel suggests Congress's concern for protect-
ing rights of individual criminal defendants, it also indicates Congress's
continued intention not to require full Sixth Amendment protections in most
cases. TLOA provides only certain tribal defendants with full Sixth
Amendment protections, thereby prioritizing tribal control over the right to
counsel in tribal courts. This recognition of tribal authority suggests that
Congress did not intend to preclude evidentiary use of tribal court guilty
pleas in state and federal courts.
C. What About the Rights of Tribal Defendants?
Although the case for admitting uncounseled guilty pleas in state and
federal courts is strong, one important objection remains: What about the
rights of tribal defendants? Advocates for exclusion contend that state and
§ 2809). Section 212 responds to complaints that the federal government, while exercising
exclusive jurisdiction over major crimes in Indian country, fails to effectively respond to res-
ervation crime. S. REP. No. 111-93, at 3, 9-10 (2009).
190. Tribal Law and Order Act § 234 (amending 25 U.S.C. § 1302).
191. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (2006 & Supp. V 2011); see also S. REP. No. 111-93, at 16
(discussing the policies underlying ICRA's sentencing limits).
192. Tribal Law and Order Act §§ 234(a)(3), 202(b).
193. S. REP. No. 111-93, at 16.
194. Tribal Law and Order Act §§ 234(a)(3), 202(c)(1).
195. Id. §§ 234(a)(3), 202(c)(2).
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federal governments have a duty to protect individual rights that overrides
their duty to facilitate tribal self-governance. In his dissenting opinion in
Spotted Eagle, Justice Leaphart pointed out the need to protect individual
rights, while disparaging the majority's emphasis on tribal sovereignty: "In
true oxymoronic fashion, our Court has said to [the defendant], 'Out of def-
erence to your Tribe, we accord you fewer protections than guaranteed to
individual citizens by the Montana Constitution.' "96 Similarly, two federal
public defenders have argued that counting prior tribal court convictions
toward federal sentences is "fundamentally unfair to Native American de-
fendants,"' 97 because many tribal justice systems deny defendants the
representation that would be guaranteed to them in state or federal court. 98
Other commentators suggest that tribes must provide all defendants fac-
ing criminal prosecution in tribal courts with protections equivalent to the
Sixth Amendment's right to counsel.' 99 Full Sixth Amendment protections
for all tribal court defendants would increase fairness and accuracy in tribal
court proceedings. 20 0 In addition, it would ensure that defendants do not lose
the right to legal counsel due to their status as members of Indian tribes and
their residence on an Indian reservation.2 0'
Despite the merits of this argument, however, the law does not require
tribal courts to provide full Sixth Amendment rights to tribal defendants.
Congress has the authority to require tribes to provide full Sixth
196. State v. Spotted Eagle, 71 P.3d 1239, 1246 (Mont. 2003) (Leaphart, J., dissenting).
197. Jon M. Sands & Jane L. McClellan, Commentary: Policy Meets Practice: Why
Tribal Court Convictions Should Not Be Counted, 17 FED. SENT'G REP. 215, 217 (2005).
198. Id. at 216.
199. Advocates of full Sixth Amendment protections for tribal defendants "recognize
and respect the importance of tribal sovereignty" but contend that tribes that elect to utilize
incarceration must grant full Sixth Amendment protections to all. E.g., Tribal Law and Order
Act of 2009: Hearing on H.R. 1924 Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland
Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 11 th Cong. 80 (2009) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R.
1924] (statement of Tova lndritz, Chair, Native American Justice Committee of the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers); see also id. at 130 (statement of Barbara L. Creel,
Assistant Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law). Congress has the
authority to require tribes to provide full Sixth Amendment rights in tribal courts.
200. See id. at 81 (statement of Tova Indritz).
201. See Letter from Tova Indritz, Chair, Native Am. Justice Comm. of the Nat'l Ass'n
of Criminal Def. Lawyers, to Daniel Akaka, Chairman, S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, and John
Barrasso, Vice Chairman, S. Comm. on Indian Affairs (Nov. 9, 2011), available at
http://www.nacdl.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=22955&liblD. The Supreme Court
has ruled that "Indian" is a political status and not a racial classification. Morton v. Mancari,
417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24 (1974). However, an individual's race is almost always an essential
factor for tribal membership. L. Scott Gould, Mixing Bodies and Beliefs: The Predicament of
Tribes, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 702, 719-20 (2001). Thus, because tribal courts only have crimi-
nal jurisdiction over members of Indian tribes, race plays an indirect but important role in
determining an individual's ability to receive legal counsel. But see United States v. Sha-
vanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 1001-02 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding that use of prior uncounseled tribal
convictions does not violate the Equal Protection Clause), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1742
(2012).
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Amendment rights in tribal courts, 20 2 but Congress has thus far declined to
do so.203 Under existing law, courts should not modify the scope of Sixth
Amendment protections that ICRA provides. Instead, advocates of extend-
ing full Sixth Amendment protections to all defendants in tribal courts must
direct their arguments to Congress.
CONCLUSION
Given the current state of the law, federal and state courts should show
respect for tribal justice systems by recognizing prior uncounseled tribal
court guilty pleas for evidentiary purposes. The Ninth Circuit's decision in
Ant established a judicial rule of excluding evidence of uncounseled tribal
court guilty pleas. However, the recent circuit decisions in Cavanaugh and
Shavanaux are inconsistent with Ant and suggest that other courts should
hesitate to follow Ant's lead.
Upon reevaluation, Ant is deeply flawed. First, its legal reasoning is un-
sound, especially in light of the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in
Nichols. International comity, as illustrated by Spotted Eagle and Sha-
vanaux, provides a viable alternative to Ant's framework for analyzing tribal
court judgments and suggests that judges should admit tribal court guilty
pleas as evidence in state and federal proceedings. Second, Ant is bad poli-
cy. Even though governments must protect the rights of individual criminal
defendants, supporting tribal authority by recognizing tribal court judgments
will ultimately lead to decreased violence on Indian land and increased con-
sistency with federal legislation. Admittedly, recognizing tribal court guilty
pleas in state and federal courts would fall far short of resolving the com-
plex relationship among tribes, states, and the federal government. However,
such recognition would constitute an important step toward mutual admira-
tion and respect.
202. Milani, supra note 74, at 1291; see also United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200
(2004) (recognizing the plenary power of Congress to modify the scope of tribal authority).
203. One important practical reason that Congress has declined to require tribal courts to
provide full Sixth Amendment rights may be the lack of funding for tribal public defenders.
Hearing on H.R. 1924, supra note 199, at 82 (statement of Tova tndritz).
